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THE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL LAW 
 







What distinguishes “criminal law” from all other law? This question should be central to 
both criminal law theory and criminal justice reform. Clarity about the distinctive feature(s) of 
criminal law is especially important in the current moment, as the nation awakens to the damage 
that the carceral state has wrought and reformers debate the value and the future of criminal law 
institutions. Foundational though it is, however, the question has received limited attention. There 
is no clear consensus among contemporary scholars or reformers about what makes the criminal 
law unique.  
This Essay argues that Antony Duff’s The Realm of Criminal Law offers an answer—and 
that the answer is correct. Duff rightly diagnoses criminal law as unique by virtue of the fact that 
it censures particular acts in the polity’s name. It is a mechanism of collective condemnation. The 
Essay advocates recognition of this concept of criminal law and draws out implications for both 
criminal law theory and criminal law reform. 




† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to express the deepest gratitude to Antony 
Duff, Doug Husak and Alec Walen for inviting me to participate in this symposium, and for their endless generosity to new scholars. 
Many thanks as well to the other participants for very helpful comments, to the Rutgers Philosophy Department for hosting us, to 






Prison abolition. Reparations. Human caging. These words have leapt from radical corners 
into mainstream discourse1 and legal scholarship,2 and it is about time. A century and a half after 
the South enacted vagrancy laws to re-enslave black men,3 America is finally grappling with the 
racial legacy of our criminal justice system. This belated awakening is driving a schism in criminal 
justice reform circles. Efforts to reduce the reach of the criminal legal system have found broad 
support along the length of the political spectrum. Increasingly, though, reformers who identify as 
abolitionists reject incremental measures that seek to remedy the worst excesses of the system 
without disrupting its basic operations.4 They understand the problem as one not of excess but of 
fundamental structure.5 The scale of the system is only a symptom. True reform requires dramatic, 
totalizing change: Abolish prisons.6 Abolish the police.7 Abolish criminal law itself.8 Reject 
textbook theories of justice and attend to the lived experience of those directly affected.9  
Antony Duff’s The Realm of Criminal Law10 does not explicitly engage these debates. 
Although Duff’s magisterial exposition addresses a social problem—overcriminalization—he 
diagnoses it as a problem of scale and, at a deeper level, of conceptual incoherence. The discussion 
does not highlight the distributional race and class concerns that animate so much contemporary 
debate. Even on its own terms, Duff’s argument for a thin, formal “master principle” of 
criminalization seems like a vehicle for piecemeal reform at best.  
Yet The Realm does bear on existential reform debates, because it addresses an overlooked 
first step in any coherent deliberation about the future of the criminal legal system: defining 
“criminal law.” What is the nature of the thing we seek to reform? What—if anything—makes 
criminal law a distinctive kind of law? Duff undertakes this task because one cannot deliberate 
about what to criminalize without determining what the criminal law is for; and one cannot 
deliberate about what the criminal law is for without determining what it is. This initial, 
definitional task, though, is necessary to more than criminalization theory. It is necessary to 
debates about the value and future of criminal law itself. And notwithstanding the centrality of the 
question, there appears to be no clear consensus among either scholars or reformers about what 
differentiates criminal law from every other kind of law. 
 
1 E.g. Ta Nehisi-Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 2014); P.R. Lockhart, The 2020 Democratic Primary 
Debate over Reparations, Explained, VOX.COM (June 19, 2019); Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might 
Change Your Mind, THE N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Apr. 17, 2019); Michael Zuckerman, Alec Karakatsanis ’08 Puts ‘Human Caging’ 
and ‘Wealth-Based Detention’ in America on Trial, HARVARD LAW TODAY (Aug. 23, 2017).  
2 E.g. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 132 Issue 6 (2019) (dedicated to prison abolition). 
3 See generally DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE 
CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008).   
4  Penal abolitionism is a broad movement that encompasses diverse groups and strains of thought. See generally Michael J. 
Coyle and Judah Schept, Penal Abolition Praxis, 26 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 319 (2018). Due to space constraints, I use the terms 
“abolitionist” and “abolitionism” quite reductively throughout this Essay.  
5 See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L. 
J. 1419 (2016); Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 262 (2018); Alec 
Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About "Criminal Justice Reform", 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 848, 852 
(2019). 
6 See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003).  
7 See, e.g., Meghan G. McDowell and Luis A. Fernandez, ‘Disband, Disempower, and Disarm’: Amplifying the Theory and 
Practice of Police Abolition, 26 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 373 (2018). 
8 See, e.g., Abolitionist Principles and Campaign Strategies for Prosecutor Organizing, COMMUNITY JUSTICE EXCHANGE,  
https://www.communityjusticeexchange.org/abolitionist-principles.  
9 See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy: Developments in the Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613 (2019). 
10 R. A. DUFF, THE REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW (2018) [hereinafter “DUFF”]. 
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This Essay contends that Duff gets the answer right.11 The fact that makes criminal law a 
unique form of law is that it operates as a mechanism of collective condemnation. It is a body of 
law and legal practice that censures particular acts in the polity’s name. This concept of criminal 
law makes sense of the bulk of existing criminal-law doctrine and institutions. To my mind, it is 
the only concept of criminal law that can. It is not a novel concept of criminal law, and it is 
consistent with nearly all theories of criminal law and punishment in current circulation. But nor 
is it universally recognized.  
Achieving clarity about the nature of criminal law is important for theory and reform 
alike.12 For purposes of theory, recognizing criminal law as a mechanism of collective 
condemnation helps to refine the questions up for debate, because the concept logically entails 
certain constraints on criminalization and punishment. For purposes of reform, recognizing 
criminal law as a mechanism of collective condemnation is essential to thinking about whether we 
want a criminal legal system at all, and what, in its best form, it should look like.  
The Realm ultimately offers a compelling case for the criminal law. Only a mechanism of 
collective condemnation can enact a polity’s shared moral code. Only a mechanism of collective 
condemnation can constitute a polity as a community of moral agents. Criminal law is not just 
useful to a liberal republic; it is vital. The challenge for reform is to forge a future in which our 
legal institution of collective censure promotes both accountability and forgiveness, condemns acts 
without condemning people, and works to mitigate inequality rather than to drive it. 
 
I. CRIMINAL LAW AS A MECHANISM OF COLLECTIVE CONDEMNATION 
 
A. What Makes Criminal Law Unique? 
 
The Realm of Criminal Law begins with this question. As Duff explains, “[a] normative 
theory of criminalization . . .  must depend on an account of what the criminal law is for.”13 And 
“[a]n account of what the criminal law is for must depend on what the criminal law is: what are its 
distinguishing features as a particular kind of law?”14  
There are several things this question is not about.  
This is not a question about the inherent meaning of the words “criminal law,” as Duff 
notes.15 They have no inherent meaning. A linguistic community might ascribe them a new 
meaning or eliminate the term altogether.16 It is, rather, a question about the set of institutions and 
practices to which those words attach.  
The question is also not about what makes criminal law a kind of law. Criminal law must 
have certain features by virtue of being law. What they are depends on what “law” is. Any concept 
of criminal law thus embeds a concept of law. The concept of law—or the nature of law, for realists 
 
11 Duff might deny that he answers the question at all. See infra Part I.B.  
12 Perhaps this Essay should be titled “The Nature of Criminal Law” and dispense with the intermediary notion of a concept. 
See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985) (describing and defending a realist 
theory of meaning); Michael S. Moore, The Various Relations between Law and Morality in Contemporary Legal Philosophy, 25 
RATIO JURIS 435, 438-40 (2012). (differentiating between effort to draw “analytically” versus “metaphysically” necessary 
connections between law and morality). Given space constraints and my own ambivalence, I leave the question open.   
13 DUFF, supra note 10, at 11. 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 50-51. 
16 Cf. Vincent Chiao, What is the Criminal Law For?, 35 L. & PHIL. 137, 159 (2016) (expressing skepticism about the 
importance of “received legal categories”). 
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about meaning17—is the subject of enduring and intricate debate, but for present purposes it 
suffices to note that contemporary positivists and non-positivists alike acknowledge certain 
features as central to a system of law: the existence of action-guiding norms that are publicly 
available, intelligible, generally applicable, prospective rather than retrospective, and enforced by 
a neutral authority through procedures that guard against error.18 To qualify as criminal law, a 
given set of norms and institutions must first of all qualify as law.  
Finally, the question of what makes criminal law unique is notably not about what is most 
central to criminal law, nor about which of its features do the most good or the most harm. Those 
questions are important. But they are not at issue here.  
The question at issue here is what distinguishes criminal law from every other kind of law. 
This question is logically prior to questions about what justifies criminal law, what criminal law 
is for, and how to reform criminal law. To answer such questions—to even consider them—it is 
necessary to identify the object they address. When we talk about “criminal law,” what are we 
talking about?  
As Michael Moore has explained, this question embeds two layers. We need to know not 
only what kind of thing criminal law is, but also what “kind of kind.”19 Criminal law might be a 
nominal kind: a set of doctrines and institutions that have evolved in the particular shape they have 
purely by happenstance, to which we attach the label “criminal law” by mere convention. If 
criminal law is a nominal kind, the only kind of definition possible is a description of its current 
state. The concept of criminal law is coextensive with the reality of criminal law, and there are no 
normative criteria intrinsic to criminal law by which to judge its current operation. We can only 
judge the success of criminal law by reference to extrinsic normative criteria. The other possibility 
is that criminal law has a deeper identity: We designate a set of doctrines and institutions as this 
particular kind of law by virtue of certain structural or functional features. If that is so, a definition 
of “criminal law” requires identification of the relevant features.20 The concept of criminal law is 
a statement of those features that are necessary and sufficient to constitute an instance of criminal 
law.21 If criminal law has this kind of deeper identity, we can evaluate how successful a given 
criminal law system is as criminal law, as well as with reference to extrinsic normative criteria. 
 
B. Duff’s (Ambivalent) Answer 
 
Duff himself does not purport to offer a concept of criminal law at all. He is both modest 
and cautious; he claims only to present his own particular conception of criminal law, one 
candidate among others.22 Yet the text is ambivalent. In his first chapter, for instance, Duff outlines 
 
17 See supra note 12. 
18 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).   
19 MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 19-23 (1997). 
20 See DUFF, supra note 10, at 12. Moore further differentiates between “natural” and “functional” kinds. MOORE, supra note 
12, at 19-23. 
21 See DUFF, supra note 10, at 12 (noting that the identification of such features will inevitably be “selective, and normatively 
informed”). 
22 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 10, at 6 (“Chapter 1 develops a conception of criminal law as a distinctive kind of legal institution 
. . . . This account is not meant to provide an analysis of ‘the concept of criminal law’—of, for instance, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for anything to count as a system of criminal law . . . .”).    
5 
 
those features he “takes to be central” to criminal law but disavows any intent to be engaged in 
conceptual analysis.23 Elsewhere he admits to conceptual analysis.24  
Regardless, The Realm does offer a concept of criminal law.25 Duff clearly believes that 
criminal law is more than a nominal kind. Criminal law has a distinct identity, he argues, and the 
fact that makes criminal law a distinctive kind of law is that it operates as a mechanism of collective 
condemnation. He writes, for instance, that the distinctive feature of criminal law is “the censure 
or condemnation that a conviction involves:”26 a conviction “formally condemns [the accused’s] 
conduct as a wrong, and formally censures her, as the agent of that conduct, as a wrongdoer.”27 
Likewise, “to criminalize a type of conduct is to portray, and condemn, it as wrongful.”28 The 
distinctive feature of punishment—the thing that differentiates it from quarantine or tax 
penalties—is that “punishment is intended to communicate or to express censure.”29 It follows that 
“censurable wrongfulness is integral to criminal law in a way that it is not integral to a system of 
non-criminal regulation.”30 
Duff never says that what is necessary and sufficient to constitute an iteration of criminal 
law, as distinct from every other kind of law, is a set of doctrines and practices that together operate 
as a mechanism of collective condemnation. He writes instead that “part of what is distinctive 
about criminal law is that it portrays the conduct that it criminalizes as wrongful.”31 Later he 
asserts, with arguable inconsistency, that “the distinctive function of criminal law . . . is that it 
helps to sustain the polity’s civil order.”32 It is almost in spite of himself that Duff offers up a 
concept of criminal law.  
Yet the collective-condemnation concept of criminal law runs throughout The Realm. It 
anchors Duff’s commitment to distinguishing public from private wrongs. It animates his 
discussion of what constitutes a polity. It both motivates and follows from his exploration of the 
ways that criminal legal systems do, can, and should call members of the polity to account for their 
public wrongs.    
This collective-condemnation concept of criminal law is not a novel one.33 Some sources, 
in fact, suggest that it is already a matter of consensus. Joshua Dressler’s Understanding Criminal 
Law—best-selling hornbook, boon to first-year law students and their teachers alike—begins with 
the assertion that the thing that “essentially distinguishes the criminal law from its civil counterpart 
. . . is the societal condemnation and stigma that accompanies the conviction”: A conviction is “an 
expression of the community’s moral outrage, directed at the criminal actor, for her act.”34 As 
 
23 E.g. id. at 6, 13. 
24 Id. at 11 (“The analytical exercise [of determining what criminal law is] is an exercise in conceptual analysis.”); 12-13 (“It 
will be a conceptual analysis insofar as I will be claiming that anything that we are to count as a system of criminal law must display 
at least some of the features that I will highlight . . . .”). 
25 Or at least a concept of criminal law in contemporary Western democracies. Duff avoids any suggestion that he—or 
anyone—could “tell us what counts as criminal law at all times and all places.” Id. at 11. 
26 Id. at 18 (asserting that “a criminal conviction is essentially censorious”).  
27 Id. at 34. 
28 Id. at 260. 
29 Id. at 19; see also id. at 37 (“[W]hat distinguishes punishments from taxes or ‘penalties’ is their typically reprobative 
nature.”). 
30 Id. at 19. 
31 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).  
32 Id. at 232. This is a strange claim. Many other fields of law—not least constitutional law—help to sustain the polity’s civil 
order. Duff presumably means that the criminal law helps to sustain the polity’s civil order in a unique way. 
33 It echoes Durkheim’s views, among others. See Emile Durkheim, Crime and Punishment, in DURKHEIM AND THE LAW 69 
(Steven Lukes and Andrew Scull eds. 1983) (opining that punishment functions “to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by 
sustaining  the common consciousness . . . to give voice to the unanimous aversion that the crime does not fail to evoke . . .  .”).   
34 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 2 (7th ed. 2015). 
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authority, Dressler cites Henry Hart’s 1958 article, The Aims of the Criminal Law, which puts the 
matter succinctly: “What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes 
it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its 
imposition.”35  
Most contemporary criminal law theorists appear to endorse the collective-condemnation 
concept of criminal law, whether explicitly or implicitly.36 Surveying scholarship on the criminal-
civil divide in 1997, Carol Steiker summarized the field as concluding that the distinguishing 
feature of punishment is that it necessarily “expresses blame.”37 And Duff himself notes that 
“theorists often include some notion of censure in their analytical accounts of criminal 
punishment,” because “a key difference between punishment and other kinds of burdensome 
imposition .  . . is that punishment is intended to communicate or express censure.”38  
Nonetheless, it is not clear that a consensus on the distinctive feature(s) of criminal law 
exists! Duff does not seem to think so.39 Many theorists, including Duff himself, are equivocal 
about whether its collective-condemnatory nature is the distinguishing feature of criminal law or 
just one of them.40 Some theorists seem to reject the notion that criminal law has any meaningful 
distinguishing feature at all; they see it as a purely nominal kind.41 Perhaps most unsettling for a 
new criminal-law teacher, her textbook never explicitly identifies or addresses the question of what 
 
35 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958).  
36 E.g. LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2009) 
(“The criminal law prevents harm by inculcating and reinforcing norms about how to treat others and operates in accordance with 
norms about deserved and appropriate punishment for the violation of those norms.”); ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA ZEDNER, 
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 14 (2014) (identifying “censure” as one of “key elements” of punishment, and implicitly as the only unique 
element); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 11, 13, 17 (2d ed. 2008) (identifying 
a culpability requirement—“the restrictive principle of Distribution”—as the thing that distinguishes punishment from preventive 
restraint, and thus criminal from non-criminal law); DOUGLAS HUSAK, IGNORANCE OF LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 26 (2016) 
(defining punishment as a state response that “deliberately expresses condemnation or stigma and imposes a deprivation or hardship 
on the offender”); Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1565 
(2016) (arguing that criminal law is distinctive as “an instrument of normative reconstruction” that operates through “condemnatory 
punishment”); MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note19, at 33 (arguing that criminal law is a 
functional kind, the distinctive function of which is to “attain retributive justice”); VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE 
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2011) (“The right to punish offenders . . . is grounded in the duties that they incur as a 
result of their wrongdoing.”); GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS: IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 32 (2010) (“To 
punish for conduct is to express the judgment that the conduct is an appropriate object of disapproval and condemnation: this is 
censure.”); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 THE MONIST 397, 400 (1965) (identifying the expression of 
blame as the distinguishing feature of punishment); Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Proportionality, in A READER ON 
PUNISHMENT 118 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994) (asserting that difference between a tax and a punitive fine is that “the 
fine conveys disapproval or censure, whereas the tax does not”). 
37 Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 
GEO. L.J. 775, 799 (1997); 800–05 (describing evolution of scholarship on question of what defines “punishment”).  
38 DUFF, supra note 10, at 19.  
39 Id. at 21 (“I would be very happy if the claim that the criminal law is essentially concerned with wrongdoing was 
uncontroversial.”). 
40 E.g. DUFF AT 6-13, 28; James Edwards, Theories of Criminal Law, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law 
(describing features of criminal law that make it “distinctive” without discussing which are necessary or sufficient to constitute 
criminal law); Antony Duff, Theories of Criminal Law, 2013, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/criminal-law (“It 
would be unproductive to ask whether all these are strictly necessary features of criminal law . . . .”). 
41 See, e.g., Chiao, supra note16, at 159 (“[T]he public law conception adopts an unapologetically revisionist attitude toward 
received legal categories generally, and the civil-criminal (or criminal-regulatory) distinction in particular.”); see also id. at 158-
59 (conceding that “the public law conception represents criminal justice institutions as functionally continuous with many other 
forms of coercive state power”); Vincent Chiao, Two Conceptions of Criminal Law, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 
25 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins, eds., 2016) (“[F]rom a public law perspective, what is unique about the criminal law is 
simply the severity of its sanctions.”). But see Chiao, supra note16, at 137 (“It is in the nature of the kind of thing it is that 
punishment—and hence the criminal law—serves to expressively vindicate rights and condemn wrongs.”).  
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distinguishes criminal from non-criminal law.42 A recent edited volume, Philosophical 
Foundations of Criminal Law, raises the question of whether we should “hope to specify the 
necessary or defining features that any practice must display if it is to count as a system of criminal 
law,”43 but does not answer it. 
So the situation is an odd one. Some authorities treat the matter as settled: The defining 
feature of criminal law is the condemnation it expresses on behalf of the community. Others 
suggest, enigmatically, that the matter is far from settled. A vast quantity of contemporary theory 
ignores or elides the question.  
This Essay advocates the following proposition: As Henry Hart wrote, as Duff (sometimes) 
asserts, the distinguishing feature of the criminal law—in conceptual terms—is that it operates as 
a mechanism of collective condemnation. A criminal conviction asserts blame in the community’s 
name. Other bodies of law deter harm and wrongdoing, incapacitate the dangerous, rehabilitate the 
compromised, and inflict hard treatment. Some other legal mechanisms speak in the name of the 
people. It is arguable that certain other bodies of law operate as condemnatory mechanisms 
(punitive damages in tort, for instance).44 But no other body of law is designed and perceived as a 
mechanism of condemnation that operates on the polity’s behalf. It cannot be said of any other 
body of law that if it ceased to express condemnation of particular acts in the name of the polity, 
it would lose any unique identity.  
 
C. Qualifications  
 
Three qualifications are in order. First, as noted above, to say that criminal law is a 
mechanism of collective condemnation does not exhaust its necessary features. It must also have 
the necessary attributes of law.45 Nor is it to say that the condemnatory aspect of criminal law is 
the only feature of the system that requires justification, or even the most important one. To the 
extent that a criminal-law system inflicts coercive deprivations of liberty, its coercive aspects 
likely stand in greatest need of justification.46 The claim is simply that the distinguishing feature 
of criminal law is that it expresses collective condemnation. 
A second set of qualifications relate to the terms of the concept itself. I have been ignoring 
a great deal of complexity in the interest of stripping the concept to its essence. But this core 
concept raises a further set of questions. What does it mean for a set of doctrines, institutions and 
practices to “operate as a mechanism of collective condemnation”? Need it so operate in every 
case? Surely not. Who need understand the condemnatory message, and what does such 
understanding entail? What does it mean for the criminal law to speak for the “collective”? What 
do we mean by “condemnation”? And so forth.  
A third qualification is that although it may be clear that the collective-condemnation 
feature is necessary to constitute a system of criminal law (as distinct from a regulatory system of 
sanctions and detention, for instance), it is far less clear that this feature is sufficient. Might other 
 
42 CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (Sanford H. Kadish, Stephen J. Schulhofer, & Rachel E. Barkow, 
eds., 10th ed. 2017). 
43 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green, eds., 2011). 
44 Cf. Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages As Intermediate Sanction, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 239 
(2009) (advocating retributive framework to guide and rationalize punitive damages). 
45 See supra Part I.A.  
46 Accord Chiao, supra note 41, at 25 (“[W]hat makes the use of such [criminal] sanctions so difficult to justify is not its [sic] 
condemnatory message per se but rather the degree of coercion with which those messages are conveyed.”). Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, 




features also be necessary? For instance: Is punishment beyond a conviction necessary, or could 
we imagine a system that only announced convictions that we would still recognize as criminal 
law? Must criminal law be dedicated to attaining retributive justice, and, if so, what does retributive 
justice require? Truth and reconciliation commissions censure wrongdoing on behalf of the polity. 
Are they criminal law institutions?47 It may be that a concept of criminal law should entail more 
detail than “a set of laws and legal institutions that operate as a mechanism of collective 
condemnation,” or it may be that no concept of criminal law can cleanly categorize everything. 
There may be paradigmatic instances of criminal law, clear instances of non-criminal law, and a 
gray borderland in between.  
 Still, it seems useful to offer this concept of criminal law at least in provisional terms. 
Acknowledging that the uniqueness of criminal law lies in its mode of collective condemnation 
offers a foundation for debates about its purpose, its justification, and its future. 
 
D. A Concept versus a Conception 
 
A last objection to the concept of criminal law proposed here is that there is no need to 
assert a concept of criminal law at all. The modest theorist should content herself, as Duff does, 
with offering one possible “conception.” The difference, put crudely, is that to assert a concept of 
criminal law is to assert an objective truth, whereas to assert a conception is to present one possible 
understanding of the phenomenon we call “criminal law” without claiming objective supremacy 
over others.48  
Notwithstanding the value of modesty, there is also value in striving to identify the concept 
of criminal law. The first reason is that there is an objective truth of the matter.49 There really are 
certain features that make the set of laws and institutions that we call “criminal law” different from 
all other bodies of law. Those features, which include the social meaning of conviction and 
punishment and the stringent procedures we consequently require to protect against error, are not 
the accidental traits of institutions that evolved by chance. They have an internal normative logic, 
which, as Duff so elegantly explains, both derives from and helps to constitute the value structure 
of a liberal republic.  
Secondly, and more importantly for present purposes, a concept of criminal law is 
necessary to criminal law theory and policy alike. We can argue all day about the justification of 
punishment or criteria for criminalization, but if we are all operating with different conceptions of 
the criminal law, we are arguing past each other. Our conflicting views about criminalization may 
be equally sound given our divergent conceptions of what it is to criminalize. The abolitionist 
challenge to criminal law institutions highlights the need for foundational clarity. A shared concept 
of criminal law is essential to fruitful debate over whether we need criminal law and, if so, how to 
make it the best it can be.50   
 
II. THE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL LAW AS A FOUNDATION FOR THEORY 
 
 
47 Thanks to Victor Tadros for suggesting the example.  
48 See generally, e.g., Maite Ezcurdia, The Concept-Conception Distinction, 9 PHIL. ISSUES 187 (1998). Cf. Chiao, supra note 
41 (describing “two conceptions of criminal law”). 
49 In my subjective opinion.  
50 Again, there is a question as to whether we need a “concept” of criminal law or should just proceed on a direct-reference 
theory of meaning, as Michael Moore does. See supra note 12.  
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Recognizing criminal law as a mechanism of collective condemnation promotes clarity in 
theoretical debate, because the concept logically entails certain constraints on criminalization and 
punishment. They include four central features of Duff’s criminalization framework. First, given 
that the criminal law condemns, things designated as crimes must warrant condemnation.51 
Criminal laws must thus adhere to some kind of wrongfulness constraint, or “negative legal 
moralism”: “[I]f we are to maintain such a system, it should criminalize only censurably wrongful 
conduct.”52 Second, things designated crimes must warrant condemnation by the collective. This 
requires some notion of a “public wrong.” The relevant collective is the community in whose name 
the law speaks, and to whom it speaks—“the polity whose law it is”.53 Third, the censure actually 
inflicted in an individual case must be warranted; this entails a retributivist limit on punishment.54 
And fourth, criminal law, by its nature, is a communicative and declaratory enterprise that helps 
to constitute a polity’s civil order, as well as relationships between members of the polity and 
between individuals and the collective.55  
To recognize these four corollaries does not foreclose debate about their content. It does 
not begin to resolve what a coherent negative legal moralism or negative retributivism entails, 
what we should understand to constitute a “public wrong,” or the precise contours of the criminal 
law’s communicative and constitutive functions. But it does establish a clear conceptual 
infrastructure to frame those debates.  
The collective-condemnation concept of criminal law leaves other deep questions open.  
It leaves open, for instance, the question of whether punishment is necessary to the 
condemnatory mechanism. As Duff suggests, the answer might depend on how we define 
“punishment.”56 If a public judgment of guilt is itself punishment, then punishment is indeed 
necessary to criminal law. If not, it is unclear whether punishment is necessary. Duff presents a 
compelling case that it is the collective judgment of responsibility rather than the sanction imposed 
that represents the core mechanism of the criminal law.57  
The collective-condemnation concept of criminal law also leaves open the question of what 
the criminal law is for. It establishes that criminal law is a distinctive kind of mechanism. But such 
a mechanism might be put to many uses. 
By way of analogy, consider a hammer. A hammer is “a hand tool consisting of a solid 
head set crosswise on a handle and used for pounding.”58 Its distinctive mode of operation is to 
pound. The purpose of a hammer, though, can be stated more broadly. Hammers are used to drive 
nails into wood, build houses, break things apart, and shape metal. A single hammer can have 
 
51 I assert this in simple terms although it is surely not so simple. “Must” could refer to either a practical or normative 
requirement. As a practical matter, a system of collective condemnation primarily directed at blameless acts would face resistance. 
As a normative matter, a system that primarily condemned blameless acts would be incoherent and dishonest. I am assuming that 
“coherence” and “honesty” are normative criteria for any system of law.  
52 DUFF, supra note 10, at 21.  
53 DUFF, supra note 10, at 117. 
54 Or at least on the “censure” element of punishment, if its constitutive elements of “censure” and “sanction” can be severed. 
See YAFFE, supra note 36, at 32.  
55 As well as The Realm, see generally R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001). 
56 See DUFF, supra note 10, at 223-25. 
57 Accord, e.g. DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 2 (“‘The essence of punishment . . . lies in the criminal conviction itself,’ rather 
than in the specific hardship imposed as a result of the conviction.”); see also Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: 
A Response, 10 JURISPRUDENCE 110, 113 (2019) (“The argument for seeing the aims of criminal law and punishment as distinct 
should primarily be understood as a conceptual distinction aimed at opening up space for broader reflection on the aims of the 
criminal law.”). 
58 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 563 (11th ed. 2005).   
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many purposes. The purpose of any particular hammer depends on its context and the intentions 
of the person who wields it. 
The criminal law’s mechanism of collective condemnation might likewise be directed 
toward any number of goals. The central purpose of criminal law could be to help to constitute and 
sustain a polity’s civil order, as Duff sometimes suggests.59 Or it could be, as Michael Moore 
contends, to “attain retributive justice.”60 It could be harm prevention—or “securing civil 
order”61—via deterrence,62 the inculcation of pro-social norms or attitudes,63 incapacitation, 
treatment or training of the crime-prone, or some combination. As Duff notes, furthermore, there 
seems little reason to assume that the criminal law must be limited to a single purpose.64 It could 
have multiple purposes.65 Different areas of criminal law might even have different objectives.66 
The aims of the criminal law might remain in perpetual flux. They might depend on the nature and 
the aims of the polity whose law it is.67 
This is not to say that the collective-condemnation concept of criminal law imposes no 
constraint on its purposes. The criminal law’s distinctive mode of operation—censuring in the 
name of the polity—must be at least a part of its purpose.68 Arguably, this is the criminal law’s 
“intrinsic” purpose (or function) whereas the further goals we might use the censuring mechanism 
to pursue are “instrumental” purposes (or functions).69 Relatedly, the fact that censure and 
punishment must be limited by desert means that the criminal law is not always an effective means 
of pursuing goals like harm prevention.70 The tension between its distinctive mode of moral 
censure and utilitarian goals like harm prevention leads some theorists to conclude that the criminal 
law cannot coherently pursue both retributive and utilitarian objectives.71 Others think that, tension 
notwithstanding, multiple purposes are possible.72 The relevant point here is that the collective-
condemnation concept of criminal law does not resolve the debate.  
Nor does the collective-condemnation concept of criminal law resolve when punishment 
is justified, beyond the constraint of negative desert. It does not determine whether (or when) desert 
is a sufficient condition for punishment as well as a necessary one. It does not determine the content 
of desert or of deserved punishment. It neither affirms nor precludes a “duty view of 
punishment.”73 And it does not resolve the relevance of utilitarian concerns to the determination 
 
59 E.g. DUFF, supra note 10, at 230. 
60 MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 19, at 32.  
61 Farmer, supra note 57, at 111. 
62 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 35.  
63 See, e.g., Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 36, at 18; Chiao, supra note 16, at 138 (“The criminal law supports the possibility 
of the rule of law—a collective life under stable public institutions—by providing crucial support to shared attitudes of 
reciprocity.”). 
64 DUFF, supra note 10, at 265; accord Chiao, supra note 16, at 138 (“In condemning wrongs and vindicating rights, the 
criminal law arguably fulfills a wide variety of functions.”). 
65 Accord DUFF, supra note 10, at 202-03 (canvassing other scholars’ arguments about the “primary purpose” of criminal law 
and offering his own). 
66 See Farmer, supra note 57, at 112. 
67 DUFF, supra note 10, at 152 (recognizing this). 
68 Thanks to Alec Walen for pushing this point.  
69 This is Michael Moore’s suggested vocabulary from the symposium.   
70 See, e.g., Darin Clearwater, ‘If the Cloak Doesn’t Fit, You Must Acquit’: Retributivist Models of Preventive Detention and 
the Problem of Coextensiveness, 11 Crim. L. & Phil. 49 (2017); Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive 
State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 317-33 (2015); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention 
as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1444 (2001).  
71 See, e.g., Moore, PLACING BLAME, supra note 19, at 83-187.  
72 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 10, at 265; Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1173 (2011). 
73 See generally VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (2011).  
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of what punishment is just. Lastly, to say that criminal law is a mechanism of collective 
condemnation does not resolve precisely what procedures it must, or should, entail.  
 I see no reason to believe that there should be unitary answers to the questions of what 
criminal law (or punishment) is for, what justifies punishment (or criminal laws), or what 
procedures are sufficient or optimal to operate a system of criminal law. It seems both possible 
and necessary for criminal-law theorists to recognize that what makes criminal law unique is the 
fact that it operates as a mechanism of collective condemnation, and thus to adopt a shared concept 
of criminal law. By contrast, perhaps it is neither necessary nor possible to reach consensus on the 
questions that this concept of criminal law leaves open.74  
 
III. THE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL LAW AS A FOUNDATION FOR REFORM 
 
Recognizing criminal law as a mechanism of collective condemnation also helps to refine 
the question of whether we want a criminal law at all. The question becomes: Do we want a 
mechanism of collective condemnation? If so, what role should it play in a diverse and fractured 
republic like the contemporary United States?  
There are reasons to doubt the value of collective condemnation. For purposes of analytical 
clarity, let us set out the stance of a hypothetical abolitionist who would reject criminal law 
altogether. The abolitionist notes that, from a utilitarian perspective, there is no reason to believe 
that a collective-condemnation mechanism is an especially effective means of preventing harm, 
relative to alternatives. Given its costs, she argues, we should simply excise it from the state’s 
arsenal of crime-control measures. We can focus instead on more cost-effective strategies to 
remedy the conditions that give rise to harmful behavior in the first place, and on practices of 
therapeutic and restorative justice that ameliorate harm when it happens.75 If the state must resort 
to some kind of coercion to prevent harmful acts, it should at least forego moral judgment.76 
The abolitionist might cite several grounds for preferring non-judgmental coercion. One is 
the metaphysical view that rejects moral responsibility entirely.77 A second is the more pragmatic 
notion that, whatever its value in theory, a mechanism of collective condemnation will inflict too 
much injustice in practice. One variant of this argument might be that in the contemporary United 
States, we lack the kind of collective that can sustain a functional criminal law; any effort to operate 
a criminal legal system will merely impose the will of the powerful on the powerless.78 Another 
variant might be that, in a society marked by structural inequality, criminal law enforcement will 
 
74 In terminology invoked by Antony Duff and Stuart Green, perhaps criminal law theory should be both “simple” and “neat” 
with respect to the question of what makes criminal law a distinctive kind of law, but both “complex” and “messy” with respect to 
questions about its purpose(s), justification(s), and procedures. DUFF & GREEN, Introduction, in supra note 43, at 8-10. 
75 Cf. Chiao, supra note 16, at 160 (raising the question of whether we need coercive institutions); McLeod, supra note 9 
(urging a shift toward restorative and therapeutic practices as a response to harm). 
76 Chiao, supra note 16, at 145-47, 159-61 (questioning “whether we should continue to prefer a guilt-conditioned scheme of 
coercive rule-enforcement to less destructive means of promoting pro-social cooperative attitudes”). 
77 Determinism poses a deep challenge to any form of moral judgment. If we are fully determined creatures, choice is an 
illusion and both praise and blame are groundless. The metaphysical objection finds support in each new field of inquiry to take 
the baton in the progress of human knowledge, most recently neuroscience and statistics. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain 
Overclaim Redux, 31 LAW & INEQ. 509 (2013). The merits of this view are beyond the scope of this Essay.  
78 Our history of racial oppression and wealth inequality has produced a situation in which many of the communities most 
affected by crime and criminal law enforcement—poor communities of color—feel little connection to the institutional apparatus 
of the criminal law. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2072 
(2017) (“Most discussions of African American distrust of the police only skirt the edges of a deeper well of estrangement between 
poor communities of color and the law—and, in turn, society.”). But see Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal 
Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (2019) (exploring means to promote “an inclusive system of criminal adjudication responsive 
to the multidimensional demands of the popular will,” including historically excluded groups). 
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tend to disproportionately burden already-marginalized groups.79 That burden has a pernicious 
character. High rates of prosecution and conviction not only inflict tangible harm, disrupting lives 
and splintering families. Because convictions express condemnation, a disparate conviction rate 
among a marginalized group also conveys condemnation of the group as a whole. Mass conviction 
means mass condemnation.80 Worst of all, because each conviction is theoretically deserved, the 
aggregate condemnation can appear deserved as well. Of course it is not. The notion that 
historically marginalized communities deserve the fruits of their exclusion is, to put it mildly, 
perverse. The hypothetical abolitionist might argue that the injustice of this disparate 
condemnation outweighs any benefit the criminal law could provide. 
Yet there are also reasons to cherish and protect the criminal law. The Realm lays some of 
them out, for Duff sees a mechanism of collective condemnation as vital to a liberal republic. Duff 
does not stake his claim on utilitarian grounds. Perhaps alternative approaches to crime control are 
more effective at that task! Duff’s view, rather, is that criminal law is indispensable because it is 
uniquely capable of constituting a polity as a community of moral agents.81   
The first prong in the Duffian case is that the criminal law plays a unique role in 
constituting the civil order by virtue of the particular acts that it condemns. The process of 
criminalization is recursive. The polity’s civil order shapes its decisions about what to criminalize; 
its criminal code, in turn, helps to shape its civil order.82 This kind of recursivity is inherent to all 
democratic law-making. But the moral valence of a criminal code makes it a more immediate 
reflection of—and input to—the moral life of the polity than, say, the polity’s highway regulations. 
Only a criminal code can set out a polity’s consensus that certain acts are so destructive of the 
social fabric that they warrant condemnation in the polity’s name. The particular acts a polity 
chooses to condemn are both reflection and source of its moral identity.83 
 Second, the criminal law has a unique capacity to help constitute and sustain a civil order 
by virtue of its very existence, which expresses certain commitments on the polity’s part. It 
expresses a commitment to treating members of the polity as responsible agents.84 Only a body of 
law that recognizes and reacts to moral choices as such can affirm individual moral agency.85 Other 
mechanisms of harm prevention are indifferent to the moral quality of harmful wrongdoing. They 
treat human beings who inflict harm as so many destructive bacteria.86 Relatedly, the criminal law 
expresses a polity’s commitment to enabling a relationship of moral accountability between 
individuals and the polity as a whole.87 As Duff has long argued, criminal law is relational.88 It 
 
79 That might be because crime is partly a function of disadvantage, because law enforcement tends to target the powerless 
regardless of crime rates, or both. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2251-59 (2019).  
80 In the aggregate, the disparate impact of our current system has functionally produced official condemnation of poor 
communities of color. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010). 
81 As noted above, this stance has much in common with Durkheim and, more recently, Joshua Kleinfeld. See Durkheim, 
supra note 33; Kleinfeld, supra note 36.  
82 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 13, at 144, 203, 332.  
83 Accord Durkheim, supra note 33.  
84 Id. at 201-11. 
85 Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (1968); cf. Marcus Kirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: 
Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113 (1998). 
86 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1589 (1994) (noting that “the criminal law 
might treat persons as part of the biophysical flotsam and jetsam of the universe and respond solely on the basis of the type and 
degree of dangerousness people threaten, without regard to moral responsibility”); Mayson, supra note70, at 322-323 (exploring 
the distinction between law that affirms individual agency and predictive restraint that is “indifferent to agency altogether”).  
87 See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 13, at 211, 213, 215, 274. 
88E.g. id. at 39 (“[I]f we are to make normative sense of a system of criminal punishment, we must understand it in more fully 
relational terms. . . .”). 
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affirms the polity’s concern for both the victim of a public wrong and for the wrongdoer as 
constituents of the political community. It partly constitutes the relationship between individuals 
and the polity. The criminal law has these capacities in virtue of the kind of thing it is—a 
mechanism of collective condemnation—regardless of what we understand to be its ultimate 
purpose(s).  
Alternative methods of coercion pose their own dangers. Even the abolitionist should admit 
that the state will sometimes have to resort to coercion to prevent the most harmful acts. It would 
indeed be preferable if we could eliminate harm solely by attending to the underlying causes of 
harmful behavior. But short of human perfection, there will be murders and rapes and assaults and 
thefts. Improved social welfare will not cure us of violence and deceit. The options for coercive 
prevention are a “guilt-conditioned scheme” or one not conditioned by guilt.89 The latter—a 
system that aspired to prevent and redress harm without condemning any act as wrongful—would 
be regulatory rather than punitive. It would not condemn. It would not punish. And it would operate 
without the constraint of desert. 
The replacement of criminal law by a regulatory prevention regime is a terrifying prospect. 
As C.S. Lewis once observed: “[W]hen we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and 
consider only what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the sphere of 
justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a 
‘case.’”90 Experts decide when the disease is cured, when the threat is disabled. Even in the best 
of circumstances, such regimes veer toward tyranny.91 This is why H.L.A. Hart describes the 
deterrent, desert-restricted scheme of criminal law as the “method of social control which 
maximizes individual freedom within the coercive framework of law”.92  
So these are the parameters of the debate. On the one hand, a formal mechanism of 
collective condemnation can inflict untold harm on marginalized groups in the service of existing 
power structures, as history proves. So long as the system mostly condemns acts that are in part a 
function of social marginalization, as “street crime” is, it will disparately condemn already-
disadvantaged groups. On the other hand, the criminal law is uniquely capable of expressing the 
moral commitments of the polity, and of affirming the agency of its subjects and their shared 
membership in a moral and political community. It is arguable that this function is critical to a 
liberal republic. A regulatory regime of coercive prevention would have an equally disparate 
impact on marginalized groups but would manage bodies without regard for desert. 
My own view is that forsaking a mechanism of collective condemnation is not the answer 
to the injustice wrought by our criminal legal system. Should we not condemn acts of exploitation 
and violence, officially and collectively?93 Clarifying the concept of criminal law, furthermore, 
highlights the fact that many facets of the current system that motivate reform are not features of 
the criminal law per se. They are perversions of it. Our statutes are rife with “crimes” that cannot 
plausibly be described as consensus public wrongs.94 Criminal process is divorced from the polity; 
 
89 Chiao, supra note 76. 
90 C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, RES JUDICATAE 225 (1954) (originally printed in 20th Century: An 
Australian Quarterly Review (1949). 
91 Id. at 228-29; cf. Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
2392 (2018) (upholding preventive Japanese internment against constitutional challenge).   
92 HART, supra note 35, at 23.   
93 Cf. Hadar Aviram, Progressive Punitivism: Notes on the Use of Punitive Social Control to Advance Social Justice Ends 
(work in progress; manuscript on file with author) (commenting on views of self-identified progressives who advocate for and 
against punitivism selectively).  
94 See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008).  
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criminal law institutions do not speak in the polity’s name.95 Rather than affirm the shared 
membership of people who commit crimes in the moral and political community that censures 
them, the criminal process operates to exclude them.96 The answer to these problems is to repair 
our system for proscribing and condemning socially destructive acts, not to jettison the system 
altogether. 
 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD: WHITHER CRIMINAL LAW THEORY? 
 
My hope is that criminal law theorists and criminal law reformers will join forces to 
envision a better future for criminal law and strive to bring that future into being. That will require 
reformers to grapple more deeply with theoretical questions about the nature, capacities, and value 
of criminal law; and it will require theorists to engage directly with the realities that motivate 
reform.97 We need both reformers and theorists in order to figure out what role a mechanism of 
collective condemnation should play in a liberal republic. That question is inseparable from the 
question of how the state should provide security. What part, if any, should the threat and execution 
of collective moral judgments play in that endeavor?98 To the extent that a mechanism of collective 
condemnation has value that is independent of its preventive effects—by enabling retributive 
justice, promoting social solidarity, or constituting a polity as a community of moral agents—how 
great is that value relative to other goods that the state might use its limited resources to pursue? 
And how must the criminal law change to realize its distinctive value?99 
There is a school of abolitionist thought that acknowledges the value of an idealized 
criminal law but denies that it is possible, in practice, to transform the system we have into the 
system we want. This too is a question worthy of theorists’ attention: Is there a viable path for 
transformation?  To answer that question, we need to know what conditions are necessary and 
sufficient to make the condemnatory mechanism of criminal law meaningfully “collective”. In 
Duff’s terms, we need to identify the criteria for a moral and political community, and for the 
criminal law to speak in the polity’s name.100 We might also consider how to weigh the value of 
moral accountability on an individual scale against the harm of undeserved group condemnation.101 
 
95 See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012); Simonson, supra note 78.   
96 See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (2015); Mayson, supra note 70.   
97 Cf. Robert Weisberg, Barrock Lecture: Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1208 
(2012) (arguing “that both deontological and utilitarian philosophies of punishment will founder in irrelevance unless they accept 
some intellectual responsibility for engaging the stubborn facts of a system of imprisonment they often justify or enable”). 
98 Outside the rarefied air of criminal law theory conferences, it is often assumed that (1) criminal law must be our primary 
method of crime control and (2) crime control is the primary purpose of criminal law. Both assumptions are dubious, to say the 
least. For an argument that grassroots police-reform movements have helped to raise first-order questions about how the state 
should provide security, see Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens (work in progress; manuscript on file with 
author). Assuming that criminal law will continue to play some role in the state’s crime control efforts, there are of course further 
questions about how criminal law institutions can most effectively promote public safety. See generally RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, 
PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019) (urging more reliance on expert institutions to 
develop rational, evidence-based crime control policy). 
99 Duff offers one compelling vision. For another vision of criminal process that maintains an emphasis on collective moral 
judgment within a framework of accountability and healing, see generally DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, 
MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD TO REPAIR (2019); see also Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding 
and Reforming Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L.REV. 1143 (2006) (investigating a “popular preference for ‘accountability-
reinforcing sanctions’" and exploring the role of accountability in punishment).    
100 Duff himself, of course, has given this question considerable attention. In addition to The Realm, see generally Duff, supra 
note 55; see also Simonson, supra note 78. 
101 This conflict is one manifestation of the metaphysical tension at the heart of criminal law. We believe in individual agency 




And we might think more carefully about what normative criteria govern criminalization and 
punishment in the aggregate. Can we have a criminal law that does not direct its censure and 
coercion primarily against disadvantaged groups—if, for instance, we shift criminalization and 
enforcement away from quality-of-life crimes and toward securities fraud? What are the criteria 
for the shape of the criminal law as a whole, beyond those for individual offenses?102 Given the 
recursivity of the criminal law, perhaps we have a duty to make criminalization decisions in order 
to re-constitute the civil order in ways that redress past racial harm and create a more just social 
order, whether through criminalization “on the books” or criminalization “in action”.103 Perhaps 
there is a world in which the criminal law can help to remedy the structural inequality that it has 




 To a novice professor and scholar of the criminal law, it is bewildering that there exists no 
consensus—or at least no consensus as to whether there is a consensus—about what renders the 
criminal law unique. Among the many contributions of The Realm of Criminal Law is this: It offers 
a clear concept of criminal law. It asserts, albeit with ambivalence, that what makes the criminal 
law a unique kind of law is the fact that it operates as a mechanism of collective condemnation.  
 Can we agree that Duff is right about this? Recognizing the uniquely condemnatory aspect 
of criminal law allows for cleaner theory. We can acknowledge logical corollaries of the concept 
of criminal law, including some form of negative legal moralism, some notion of a public wrong, 
a retributive limit on punishment, and the fact that criminal law is relational. Maybe we can accept 
pluralism with respect to the potential aims and justifications of criminal laws and sanctions. Most 
importantly, we can better confront the question of whether criminal law is necessary or valuable, 
and how we might strive for the most just criminal law possible in an unjust world.  
 
rates among disadvantaged groups demonstrate that convictions flow, in significant part, from undeserved circumstances. Cf. 
Weisberg, supra note 98, at 1240 (“Is it possible to defend an ethos of individual responsibility when it is instantiated in a practice 
that has led to the mass production of ruined lives?”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY 
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER 3 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995).  
102 Some theorists have started down this path. See Vincent Chiao, Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment, 11 
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 431, 450 (2017) (arguing for the necessity of “[a] normative theory of criminal justice that takes seriously the 
aggregate costs and benefits of those institutions, as well as how those costs and benefits are distributed across a population.”); see 
also Chiao, supra note 16, at 154; Hamish Stewart, The Wrong of Mass Punishment, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 45, 46 (2018) (arguing 
that “a policy of relentless prosecution and punishment is unjust in a free society” and characterizing this as “a retributive argument 
against mass punishment”). 
103 DUFF, supra note 13, at 40-50.   
